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Abstract 
 
While earlier studies focus on credit booms in advanced and emerging market countries, 
this paper examines the characteristics and determinants of credit booms in developing 
countries. The results find that credit booms in developing countries are less likely to be 
associated with systemic banking crises. Rather, they are more likely to be the result of 
financial deepening than of dangerous buildups of financial risks; the prevention of credit 
booms in developing countries may thus be associated with higher opportunity costs in terms 
of foregone growth opportunities. Random effect probit and tobit regressions find some 
evidence that size of financial system and favorable macroeconomic conditions are among 
the determinants of credit booms. Although monetary and fiscal policies do not help in 
preventing credit booms in developing countries, we find that prudential regulations and 
supervision can play a much more effective role in preventing “bad” booms, while 
incurring substantially lower costs. Although “bad” booms are hard to identify ahead of 
time, the duration and size of booms, as well as the level of credit aggregates, appear to be 
useful indicators in determining them.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Credit or lending plays an important role in supporting economic growth. An insufficient 
supply of credit to the private sector can constrain economic activities, which ultimately 
undermines the long-run growth prospects for an economy (Levine, 2005). However, rapid 
expansion of credit, or so-called credit booms, can be equally damaging to growth, as they 
are sometimes followed by episodes of financial distress and banking crises. The latter 
scenario is increasingly documented in recent literature and contributes to the belief that 
credit booms can be a recipe for financial crises (for example, see Caprio and Klingebiel, 
1996, Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerrtche, 2001, and Borio and Lowe, 2002). These 
concerns have been heightened since the recent global financial crisis, which in turn has 
brought a lot of attention for countries and international bodies to develop toolkits to 
monitor and prevent excessive expansion of credit. 
 
Although some episodes of credit booms can be associated with heightened financial 
imbalances and risks of financial crises, the importance of credit in financial deepening and 
growth dynamics as described in other strands of the literature cannot be ignored. History 
tells us that not every credit boom ends in a crisis; thus, the cost of curtailing credit growth 
can be quite substantial, particularly in the context of developing countries, which still 
require a huge expansion of credit to meet their growing consumption and investment 
needs.  
 
The trade-off arising from allowing or preventing rapid credit growth poses a policy 
dilemma. Improved policy responses to this trade-off surely require an in-depth 
understanding of the characteristics of credit booms. A number of studies have discussed 
various aspects of credit booms, ranging from the association between credit booms and 
booms in other macroeconomic variables
3
 to potential drivers of credit booms and the 
implications of such booms for financial stability, financial deepening, and long-term 
economic growth. Among these studies, we focus our attention on investigations of the 
potential determinants of credit booms, the aims of which are closely associated with the 
objective of this paper.     
 
Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche (2001), one of the first comprehensive studies 
focusing on credit booms, uses an event study covering a sample of 91 advanced and 
emerging countries in Latin America and the rest of the world; they suggest that a number 
                                                          
3 The macroeconomic variables previously studied include domestic investment and consumption 
booms, housing price booms, real exchange rate appreciation, current account deterioration, and 
reserve position.  
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of macroeconomic variables
4
 change during the buildup of credit booms, implying that 
these variables possibly trigger such booms.  
 
Mendoza and Terrones (2008) complement earlier studies by providing an alternative 
methodology to identify credit boom episodes to which later studies adhere closely, and 
also use an event analysis method with a sample of 49 countries. They find that credit 
booms in emerging market economies tend to be preceded by large capital inflows and not 
by domestic financial reforms or TFP gains, while credit booms in industrial countries are 
likely to be preceded by high TFP gains or financial reforms. Later, with a sample of 61 
emerging and industrial countries and longer time periods, Mendoza and Terrones (2012) 
revise their conclusion that in both industrial and emerging economies, credit booms often 
follow surges in capital inflows, TFP gains, and financial reforms, and are far more 
common with managed than with flexible exchange rate regimes.  
 
Elekdag and Wu (2013) also use event analysis with 21 advanced and 43 emerging 
economies and indicate that credit booms are associated with episodes of large capital 
inflows; and that loose macroeconomic policy stances, especially regarding monetary 
policy, also appear to be important drivers of real credit growth across emerging 
economies, including those in Asia.    
 
The above-mentioned papers employ the event analysis approach, which can be useful in 
terms of discovering and explaining important stylized facts, particularly key non-linear 
relationships. However, these results cannot be interpreted with any causal implication. 
Fewer studies attempt to establish causality via econometric approaches. For instance, IMF 
(2011) applies a panel logit model with 47 advanced and emerging market economies to 
study the underlying factors leading to credit booms; and finds that financial sector reforms, 
TFP gains, and in particular, net capital inflows appear to be good predictors of credit 
booms. Similarly, the study of Arena et al. (2015) on 135 middle- and low-income 
countries using event analysis and panel probit regression suggests that capital inflows are 
important determinants of credit boom episodes in middle- and low-income countries. 
Particularly with event analysis, countries with less flexible exchange rates may experience 
significant credit growth at the time of capital inflow surges, while financial openness can 
also trigger credit booms.  
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 The changing macroeconomic variables include output gap, investment, consumption, domestic real 
interest rate, inflation, real exchange rate, current account balance, private capital inflows, short-term 
external debt, and terms of trade.  
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Calderón and Kubota (2012) examine the role of gross capital inflows in causing credit 
booms using event and probit regression analyses with quarterly data from a sample of 71 
countries and conclude that surges in gross private capital inflows, especially other 
investment inflows, are good predictors of credit booms. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) employ 
simple pooled OLS regression to study some policy variables that may trigger credit booms 
and conclude that credit booms seem to occur more often in countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes and expansionary macroeconomic policies. However, their regression results 
are based on a pool of both industrial and emerging economies sampled together and with 
relatively few observations in the sample. They further explain that the duration and 
magnitude of a boom has been a predictor of whether the boom ends up in a banking crisis 
(“bad” booms), which is in line with results reported in Gourinchas et al. (2001) and 
Barajas, Dell’Ariccia, and Levchenko (2008). Other macroeconomic variables including 
larger current account deficits, higher inflation, lower quality banking supervision, and 
faster growing asset prices may help predict “bad” booms, but they do not find any 
statistical significance.  
 
In this paper, we will contribute to the existing empirical literature on the determinants of 
credit booms in a number of ways. First, previous studies focus their analyses on advanced 
and emerging market economies. Some of them even combine data from such countries 
together into pooled regression analyses, although these countries share broadly different 
characteristics and stages of development. Instead, our paper will focus on credit booms in 
developing countries and compare them with those in advanced and emerging market 
economies. Second, in addition to a binary response probit model, this paper provides the 
first attempt with a tobit regression model to provide a robustness check on the findings 
from the probit model and also to identify which factors may potentially trigger magnitude 
of the booms. Moreover, our econometric approach will focus on the role of domestic 
policies in curbing or developing credit booms, which are rarely highlighted in previous 
studies. Finally, we perform our analysis on a broader set of countries. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology for 
identifying credit boom episodes and empirical approaches to estimate the determinants of 
credit booms and the ones ending in banking crises. Section 3 offers data sources and 
variable definitions used in this paper. Section 4 provides some main stylized facts on the 
characteristics of credit booms, while section 5 presents empirical results from the 
regression models. Section 6 gives conclusions and policy implications. 
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Identification of Credit Boom Episodes 
 
Identifying credit booms has been achieved via two types of approaches. A number of 
studies employ statistical techniques, for example, Mendoza and Terrones (2008, 2012), 
Gourinchas, Valdes and Landarretch (2001), Barajas, Dell’Ariccia and Levchenko (2009), 
Tornell and Westermann (2002), IMF (2011), Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012), and Arena et al. 
(2015). They compare a country’s credit-to-GDP ratio or real credit per capita to its non-
linear trend and determine the episodes of credit booms when the positive deviations from 
trend pass a certain threshold. These studies differ in terms of choices of variable of credit
5
, 
choices of thresholds in identifying booms, whether the trend and the thresholds are 
country-specific, or whether the credit and GDP series is filtered separately or directly as a 
ratio. Beside purely statistical approaches, some studies use econometric methods to 
determine the long-term equilibrium level of credit or credit growth as a function of 
economic fundamentals across the whole sample of countries; they then identify the boom 
periods for a country at the points where the level of credit is above the long-run 
equilibrium level. For examples, see Calvo-Gonzalez et al. (2006); Cotarelli et al. (2005); 
Egert et al. (2007); Kiss et al. (2006); and Hansen and Sulla (2013). In this paper, following 
most recent studies, we employ the statistical approach to capture the credit boom episodes.  
 
We follow the widely used threshold method developed by Mendoza and Terrones (2012) 
to identify credit booms. They define a credit boom episode as occurring when credit to the 
private sector grows by more than that experienced in a typical business cycle expansion. 
Specifically, a credit boom occurs when the deviation in the logarithm of real credit per 
capita from its long-run trend is equal or higher than a certain threshold, defined as 1.65 
times of the standard deviation of the cyclical component
6
. We use the Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter with the smoothing parameter set at 100, which is typical for annual data, to 
decompose real credit per capita into its long-run trend and cyclical components. The 
thresholds are country-specific to ensure that credit booms are unusually large deviations 
relative to a country’s typical credit cycle. The peak year of the boom is the year of 
maximum difference between the cyclical component of real credit per capita and the 
threshold from the set of contiguous years that satisfy the credit boom condition.  
                                                          
5 Some studies use only bank credit, while others stress the importance of using credit by both banks 
and non-bank financial institutions. Also, some use credit-to-GDP ratio, while others use real credit 
per capita to proxy credit development. 
6
 The value 1.65 is chosen because it falls in the 5 percent upper tail of the standardized normal 
distribution.  
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We follow Mendoza and Terrones (2012) and use real credit per capita instead of credit-to-
GDP ratio
7
, since it is well known that the latter has certain limitations. First, there can be 
situations in which both nominal credit and GDP are falling and yet the ratio increases 
because GDP falls at a faster rate, which could lead to misleading interpretations. Also, the 
credit-to-GDP ratio does not allow for the possibility that credit and output could have 
different trends, which is important if countries are undergoing a process of financial 
deepening, or if, for other reasons, the trend of GDP and that of credit are progressing at 
different rates.   
 
One of other main objectives of this study is to analyze credit booms and their determinants 
in developing countries and compare them with those in advanced and emerging market 
economies, given the fact that countries share different characteristics and levels of 
development. To pursue this objective, we split the countries into three main groups: 
advanced economies, emerging market economies, and developing economies. To classify 
countries, we follow the IMF in categorizing countries into advanced economies and 
emerging and developing economies. However, the IMF does not distinguish emerging 
markets and developing countries. To split them, we then follow the classification systems 
of the Morgan Stanley Capital International Index, S&P Dow Jones Index and FTSE 
Emerging Index. As a result, our sample classification comes up with 29 advanced 
economies, 24 emerging market economies, and 107 developing economies. A list of 
economies and their classifications is given in appendix 1.  
 
2.2. Determinants of Credit Booms 
 
To examine the determinants of credit booms, we consider two applicable models, namely 
random effect panel probit models and random effect panel tobit models, with the sample 
of 160 advanced, emerging market, and developing economies over the period of 1960–
2013. Our general specification is as follows:  
     (          ), (1) 
where   is the credit boom variable;  ( ) stands for the distribution function;    is an 
unobserved time-invariant individual effect; and x contains variables of macroeconomic 
development and structural characteristics, as well as macroeconomic and financial 
policies. Those are credit-to-GDP ratio, GDP growth, inflation, current account balance as a 
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 Studies by Gourinchas et al. (2001), Barajas et al. (2007), Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) use the credit-to-
GDP ratio.  
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proportion of GDP, capital inflows as a proportion of GDP, trade openness, exchange rate 
regimes, monetary policy stance, fiscal policy stance, financial reform index, and quality of 
banking supervision and regulations. All explanatory variables are used in lag form to avoid 
potential endogeneity problems and thus ensure that the direction of causality is from the 
explanatory variables to the dependent variable, but not vice versa. 
 
Equation (1) is a probit model when we estimate the model for credit boom incidence,  
   (            )   (          ), 
where  ( ) denotes the cumulative density function of normal standard distribution and     
takes value one when there is a credit boom, and zero, otherwise.  
 
Equation (1) is a tobit model when we estimate the model for magnitude of the credit 
booms: 
       (                )  
where     is the magnitude of the booms obtained by taking the difference between (log) 
real credit per capita and its trend value during the credit boom, and zero, otherwise.  
 
The use of random effects probit and tobit models allows us to account for the 
heterogeneity with the inclusion of individual country effects in the conditional mean. Also, 
the tobit models for panel data are usually estimated by random effects rather than by fixed 
effects, because the fixed effect estimations require a very high number of periods (the so-
called incidental parameter problem). 
 
2.3. Determinants of Credit Booms Ending in Banking Crisis (“Bad” Booms) 
 
In similar manner to previous papers, we use a probit regression model to study the drivers 
of “bad” booms, modelled as follows:  
   (       )   (   ); 
where  ( ) denotes the cumulative density function of the normal standard distribution and 
   takes value one when a credit boom is followed within two years from its end by an 
episode of banking crisis, and zero, otherwise
8
. Explanatory variables, in addition to above-
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 All non-boom observations are dropped from the sample. 
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mentioned variables, also contain variables that capture the duration and magnitude of 
booms, as we also want to examine if duration and size of a boom matters in predicting a 
boom ending in a banking crisis.  
 
Given the cross-sectional nature of the boom duration, we examine this section with a 
cross-sectional probit model. Thus, the panel dataset is collapsed into a simple cross-
sectional form; and each observation reflects the mean value of all variables except 
duration over each boom period.  
 
3. Data and Variable Definitions 
 
The sample in this paper covers 160 countries: 29 advanced economies, 24 emerging 
market economies, and 107 developing economies. It spans the period from 1960 to 2013, 
though data for some variables are less due to update availability. 
 
Real credit per capita is calculated as the end-of-year nominal credit per capita deflated by 
its corresponding GDP deflator. We use credit to private non-financial sector obtained from 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the BIS’s statistics. Measure of credit 
is the sum of claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and, whenever available 
for the entire sample period for a country, the claims on private sector by other financial 
institutions.  
 
Capital inflows are measured as gross liability flows that include foreign direct investment, 
portfolio flows, and other investment liabilities, as a percentage of GDP, obtained from 
IFS. Data on inflation (calculated by GDP deflator), GDP growth, current account balance 
in percent of GDP, and trade openness (measured by the sum of exports and imports as a 
percent of GDP) are obtained from World Development Indicators, IFS, IMF’s Balance of 
Payments Statistics, and UNCTAD’s statistics. Exchange rate regimes are taken, with 
updated data, from Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2008) fine classification, in which 
higher values correspond to more flexibility in exchange rate regimes.  
 
Domestic financial reforms are measured by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008). This 
index takes values between 0 and 21 and captures changes in several financial policy 
dimensions such as credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry 
barriers, state ownership in the banking sector, capital account restrictions, prudent 
regulations and supervision of the banking sector, and securities market policy. Quality of 
banking supervision and regulation index is taken from the same source. We measure the 
monetary policy stances as the error terms obtained from a simple regression of policy rates 
-9- 
 
on inflation and GDP growth. Similarly, fiscal policy stances are calculated as the error 
terms obtained from a simple regression of general government balance as a percentage of 
GDP on GDP growth. Data on policy rates and general government balance are obtained 
from the IFS. We also use data on banking crises from Laeven and Valencia (2012)
9
.  
 
4. Episodes of Credit Booms: Stylized Facts 
 
4.1. Credit Boom Incidence 
 
Following Mendoza and Terrones (2012), we calculate the incidence, duration and 
magnitude of credit boom episodes based on our sample of 29 advanced economies, 24 
emerging market economies, and 107 developing economies over the 1960-2013 period. In 
total, we identify 159 episodes of credit boom in our sample. The list of those credit booms 
and their peak years is in appendix 2. 
 
Table 1: Frequency of Credit Boom Episodes Based on Real Credit Per Capita 
(Boom Parameter = 1.65) 
 
Advanced         
Economies 
Emerging Market 
Economies 
Developing      
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
  Number  Percent Number  Percent Number  Percent Number 
Full sample periods 45 28.3 26 16.4 88 55.3 159 
1990s 8 18.6 10 23.3 25 58.1 43 
2000s 15 31.3 7 14.6 26 54.2 48 
Source: Authors’ calculations following the methodology of Mendoza and Terrones (2012).   
 
Table 1 shows the frequency of boom episodes across groups of countries. Of 159 credit 
boom episodes, the most booms (55.3 percent) occur in developing countries, followed by 
advanced economies (28.3 percent), and emerging market economies (16.4 percent). Across 
time, more credit booms are found in the 2000s than in the 1990s, specifically in advanced 
economies. However, the frequency of boom incidence is lower in developing and 
emerging market economies. 
                                                          
9
 A country is considered to have experienced a systemic banking crisis if its banking system experienced 
significant signs of financial stress (indicated by significant bank runs, losses, and bank liquidations); and 
also if significant policy interventions can be observed in response to losses in the banking system. Policy 
interventions are considered to significant if the following forms of interventions have been used: significant 
guarantees are put in place, extensive liquidity support (5 percent of deposits and liabilities to 
nonresidents), bank restructuring costs (at least 3 percent of GDP), or significant bank nationalizations 
took place. 
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Table 2: Probability of a Boom Occurring in a Country in a Year, Average  
  Parameter for Boom Start/End: 0.25 Parameter for Boom Start/End: 0.75 
 
Parameter for Boom Episode: 1.65 Parameter for Boom Episode: 1.65 
  
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Full sample periods 0.166 0.136 0.102 0.121 0.122 0.102 0.068 0.084 
1990s 0.188 0.210 0.117 0.144 0.116 0.169 0.079 0.100 
2000s 0.203 0.142 0.110 0.132 0.169 0.113 0.078 0.100 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The beginnings and ends of boom episodes are defined as occurring when the deviation from trend is a 
certain value of parameter times the standard deviation of the cyclical component. 
 
Table 3: Duration of Credit Boom Episodes, Average 
  Parameter for Boom Start/End: 0.25 Parameter for Boom Start/End: 0.75 
 
Parameter for Boom Episode: 1.65 Parameter for Boom Episode: 1.65 
 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Full sample periods 4.82 4.96 4.51 4.67 3.51 3.73 2.98 3.25 
1990s 6.00 4.60 4.52 4.81 3.50 3.80 2.80 3.16 
2000s 4.60 5.14 4.54 4.65 3.71 3.71 3.14 3.39 
Note:   See note in Table 2 
 
 
Table 4: Magnitude of Credit Boom Episodes 
  
Deviation of Real Credit per Capita 
from Trend at Peak 
Average Growth Rate of Real Credit 
per Capita 
Average Growth Rate of Credit-to-
GDP Ratio 
 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Full sample 
periods 14.7 26.5 32.7 26.6 12.6 17.3 23.3 19.2 10.5 16.0 22.8 18.2 
1990s 12.3 34.0 30.5 27.9 13.2 20.2 22.5 19.8 11.3 19.4 24.4 20.3 
2000s 18.6 18.1 35.8 27.8 16.5 12.1 26.9 22.3 16.6 10.9 25.9 21.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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To account for different sample periods across country groups, we calculate the average 
probability that a country experiences a boom in a year. Table 2 shows that over the whole 
sample period, developing countries experience the least likelihood of a credit boom. This 
is true across time, while emerging market economies in the 1990s had the highest 
probability of experiencing a boom. The likelihood of experiencing a boom in both 
developing and emerging market economies decreases over time, in contrast with that in 
advanced economies.  
 
Table 3 indicates the duration of credit booms. Across all groups, we find that the average 
duration of credit booms is roughly 5 years
10
. Booms in developing countries are shorter 
compared with booms in advanced and emerging market countries. Across time, there is no 
clear distinguishing feature of boom durations in developing economies. However, the 
duration of booms is shorter in advanced economies.  
 
If we look at the magnitude of credit booms in Table 4, we see that developing economies 
experience a greater size of credit booms. For example, at the peak of the booms, the 
average expansion of real credit per capita reaches more than 30 percent above trend in the 
developing economies, twice as much as in advanced economies. We further proxy 
magnitude of credit booms by using average growth rate of real credit per capita and 
average growth rate of credit-to-GDP ratio from the start to the peak of booms; the results 
give the same conclusion. Larger booms in developing countries may result from the fact 
that level of credit aggregates in those countries are still at a relatively low base.   
 
4.2. Credit Booms and Systemic Banking Crises 
 
Table 5: Credit Booms and Banking Crises 
 
Percent of Credit Booms                    
Associated with Banking Crises 
Percent of Banking Crises               
Associated with Credit Booms 
 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Full sample periods       24.4 42.3 12.5 20.8 50.0 45.8 16.7 29.8 
1990s 37.5 70.0 8.0 30.6 60.0 58.3 11.1 26.4 
2000s 46.7 28.6 15.4 27.1 50.0 50.0 62.5 53.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                                                          
10
 Our results are mainly based on the parameter value of 0.25 for boom start/end. Using a higher parameter 
value will shorten the boom duration; however, the comparative conclusion remains the same.   
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Table 5 shows an important result regarding the relationship between credit booms and 
systemic banking crises. Not all credit boom episodes end in a banking crisis. With the 
whole sample of countries, not more than 20 percent of credit booms are followed by a 
banking crisis. If we divide countries in groups, we see that credit booms in developing 
economies are less prone to banking crises, given that only around 12 percent of the booms 
end in a banking crisis. This implies that most of the booms in developing countries may 
rather reflect financial deepening than risks of financial crises. However, booms in 
emerging market economies more often (more than 40 percent) end in banking crises.  
 
Classification by time period also gives us interesting findings. A greater percentage of 
booms in developing countries in the 2000s ends in crisis, relative to the case in the 1990s, 
giving an important implication that, as developing countries move up to emerging market 
status, they should be more careful regarding credit boom incidence. Surprisingly, booms in 
emerging market countries become less prone to banking crises over time, implying more 
resilience and a greater ability of their economies to handle the situation of booms turning 
bad, following the lessons from the 1990s. Looking at the advanced countries, the 
associated risks of credit booms are more concerning, as almost half of the booms in the 
past decade are followed by banking crises.  
 
Our results in Table 5 also show that while not many credit booms end in crisis, many 
crises are preceded by episodes of credit booms, particularly in emerging market countries 
and advanced economies. Specifically, almost half of the crises in emerging market and 
advanced economies are preceded by credit booms, with fewer cases in developing 
countries. However, if we concentrate on the crises in the last decade, half or more of them 
follow credit booms. Overall, our results suggest that credit boom episodes have become a 
major variable behind the financial crises in the past decade.  
 
Table 6 goes further to check whether there are different characteristics identifiable 
between credit booms ending in banking crises and those that are not. Our descriptive 
statistics suggest that booms ending in banking crises, on average, last longer, are larger in 
size, and start at higher levels of credit than those ending softly without a crisis. Even if we 
classify the data into groups of countries, the results are generally the same for developing, 
emerging market, and advanced economies. It is thus worth noting that the duration and 
size of credit booms might help explain and predict the possible consequence of these 
booms.  
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Table 6: Characteristics of Credit Booms Associated with Banking Crises 
  
Booms Ending in Banking Crises Booms Not Ending in Banking Crises 
 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Duration 6.3 5.1 5.0 5.4 4.4 4.9 4.4 4.5 
Deviation of Real 
Credit per Capita 
from Trend 9.4 20.2 24.7 18.3 9.4 12.1 18.5 15.3 
Credit-to-GDP 
ratio at the start 
of credit booms 147.5 57.7 23.0 74.0 104.3 34.9 22.1 46.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
5. Econometric Results  
 
5.1. What Are the Determinants of Credit Booms? 
 
In this section, we use the random effect panel probit regression model to study the main 
factors that trigger credit booms. Table 7 provides the regression results from the entire 
sample, classified into different groups of countries. The results show that the size of 
private sector credit relative to GDP (which to some extent can reflect the size of a financial 
system) is positively associated with the probability of credit booms. This is generally true 
across country groups, implying that the more developing and emerging market countries 
expand their financial systems, the greater the expected likelihood of credit booms. We also 
find that credit booms may start during or following buoyant economic growth, as we can 
see some evidence that lagged GDP growth positively increases the probability of credit 
boom occurrence. At the same time, inflation seems to play a clear role in explaining the 
booms in developing countries, but not in other groups of countries; which suggests that 
low inflation will contribute to a higher probability of credit booms in developing countries. 
Looking at current account balance, we find that an improved current account balance can 
often be favorable for the occurrence of credit booms across groups of our sample 
countries. Overall, our results above suggest that favorable domestic macroeconomic 
developments will broadly correlate with more incidences of credit booms; and this is 
specifically true in the case of developing countries.  
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Surges in capital inflows, an important factor in triggering credit booms, are in general not 
statistically significant, except for emerging market economies. However, in sub-samples 
including additional control variables, none is statistically significant. Similarly, exchange 
rate arrangements and trade openness, which to an extent capture the countries’ structural 
characteristics and levels of liberalization, are frequently not statistically significant, 
indicating their limited importance in explaining the episodes of credit booms across 
countries in our sample. 
 
Table 7: Determinants of Credit Booms by Groups of Countries 
  Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 when there is a credit boom 
 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Explanatory Variables are Lagged 
            
Credit to GDP 0.0119*** 0.0138*** 0.0233*** 0.0209*** 0.0245*** 0.0493*** 0.0770*** 0.0309** 
 
(0.00130) (0.00185) (0.00547) (0.00395) (0.00738) (0.0113) (0.0242) (0.0124) 
GDP Growth 0.0363*** 0.0638*** 0.0821*** 0.0218** 0.0396 0.110 0.137* -0.0248 
 (0.00741) (0.0244) (0.0217) (0.00895) (0.0246) (0.0790) (0.0727) (0.0319) 
Inflation -0.00146 0.00570** -0.000818 -0.00793*** -0.0144* -0.0406 0.000118 -0.0201* 
 
(0.00158) (0.00285) (0.00316) (0.00304) (0.00770) (0.0885) (0.00508) (0.0110) 
Current Account 
Balance 0.000316*** 0.000867*** 0.000839*** 0.000142*** 0.000355* 0.000836 0.00212*** -0.000372 
 (4.32e-05) (0.000149) (0.000173) (5.08e-05) (0.000191) (0.000639) (0.000665) (0.000295) 
Capital Inflows 0.00154 0.00155 0.0283* 0.00166 0.00252 -0.00386 -0.0848 0.0104 
 (0.00134) (0.00285) (0.0167) (0.00161) (0.00647) (0.00781) (0.0521) (0.0276) 
Exchange Rate    
Arrangements -0.00455 0.0267 0.0225 -0.00741 -0.0647*** -0.0967* -0.337*** -0.0111 
 
(0.0112) (0.0212) (0.0327) (0.0164) (0.0243) (0.0533) (0.131) (0.0362) 
Trade Openness -0.00106 -0.000332 -0.00225 0.00131 -0.00499 -0.00499 -0.00708 0.00412 
 
(0.00126) (0.00181) (0.00505) (0.00198) (0.00389) (0.00634) (0.0186) (0.0104) 
Monetary Policy Stance 
   
-0.00959** -0.195** -0.00400 -0.00337 
     
(0.00483) (0.0945) (0.00737) (0.00517) 
Fiscal Policy Stance 
   
-0.0789*** -0.221*** -0.0530 0.0268 
     
(0.0271) (0.0628) (0.0635) (0.0481) 
Financial Reforms 
   
2.266*** 7.425* 0.0149 2.766*** 
     
(0.704) (4.220) (1.749) (1.041) 
Quality of Bank Supervision 
   
-0.920*** -1.525*** 0.123 -1.039*** 
     
(0.175) (0.499) (0.411) (0.338) 
         Observations 3,701 803 577 2,321 848 276 228 344 
# of Countries 156 29 23 104 68 22 18 28 
Note: Panel probits are estimated with random effects. Coefficient estimates refer to marginal effects. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Interestingly, looking at the variables reflecting domestic macroeconomic policy stances, 
the statistical significances in the regression results vary across groups of countries. 
Theoretically, loose monetary and fiscal policy stances also contribute to a higher 
probability of credit booms by stimulating domestic aggregate demand and building up 
asset price booms. In particular, lower policy rates will bring down the cost of borrowing 
throughout the economy and increase demand for credit. Lower interest rates can also boost 
asset prices, which then increases their collateral value and thus increases borrowing 
ability. Conversely, tighter policies can bring the reverse impact and can be used as policy 
tools to contain credit booms if the existing booms may have disastrous consequences. 
However, in our results, we only see such significant evidence in the case of advanced 
economies, while in developing and emerging market economies, we do not see any 
statistical significance.  
 
The main reason for the insignificant impacts of macroeconomic policies on credit booms 
in developing countries may be related to the ineffectiveness of these policies, particularly 
monetary policies, in stimulating aggregate demand. Mishra, Montiel, and Spilimbergo 
(2010) confirm that in contrast to advanced economies, the monetary transmission 
mechanism in developing countries may be significantly weak and unreliable. Especially, 
monetary transmission in developing countries is dominated by the bank lending channel, 
as the absence of well-functioning financial markets and heavy central bank intervention in 
foreign exchange markets leave limited scope for the functioning of the conventional 
interest rate channel, asset channel, or exchange rate channel. Unfortunately, the bank 
lending channel also becomes problematic as a result of institutional deficiencies, structural 
issues in financial systems (for example, high level of bank concentration or high level of 
liquidity), and intrinsic instabilities in the domestic macroeconomic environment. Other 
studies on developing countries across various regions also report a limited effectiveness of 
monetary policy due to issues of independence and credibility of the central bank, shallow 
and illiquid financial markets, fiscal dominance, and exchange rate inflexibility; see, for 
example, Christensen, (2011); Anzuini and Levy (2007); and Egert and Macdonald (2009).  
 
Our finding on the limited role of fiscal policy in developing countries is also supported by 
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013), who stress that the degree of development of an 
economy is a critical determinant of the size of its fiscal multiplier effects. They find that 
an increase in government spending has a negative impact on output and is not statistically 
significant in the case of developing countries, whereas in contrast, the impact is positive 
and statistically significant in industrial countries. Apart from that, Tornell and Lane 
(1999), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004), and IMF (2008) find evidence that fiscal 
policy has been procyclical in developing countries, which commonly results from 
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particular underlying fundamental challenges
11
. The procyclical nature of fiscal policy in 
those countries may thus give limited scope for fiscal policy to curb possible credit booms, 
especially under tranquil macroeconomic conditions.  
 
Looking at financial policies, another potential driver of credit booms is financial reforms. 
Financial reforms generally aim to promote financial deepening and development, which 
are then supposed to sharply boost available amounts of credit. Our paper finds such a 
positive association in both advanced and developing countries, suggesting that financial 
reforms spur high credit growth. This variable, however, is not statistically significant for 
the emerging market countries in our sample, though the sign of coefficient points in the 
right direction. On the other hand, we find statistically significant and negative 
relationships for the variable capturing the quality of banking supervision and prudential 
regulations in both advanced and developing countries. This suggests that credit booms are 
more likely to occur in countries with weak supervision and regulations. From a policy 
perspective, improving supervision and regulations can help reduce the likelihood of credit 
booms. 
 
The findings above also imply that in the context of developing countries, while the 
effectiveness of macroeconomic policies is questionable, regulatory and prudential policies 
should be placed in the front line to deal with credit booms if it appears that these booms 
will likely cause undesirable consequences. More targeted and direct approaches, like 
macroprudential and microprudential regulations and supervision, can be more effective 
and incur substantially lower costs, compared with monetary and fiscal policies. 
 
Table 8 provides the panel tobit regression results explaining which factors potentially 
influence the magnitude of credit booms. Our tobit regressions, in many cases, show similar 
results and confirm the same identified factors in determining not only the incidence, but 
also the magnitude of credit booms. For instance, expansion of financial system and 
favorable macroeconomic developments have a positive association with the size of credit 
booms, but we find less evidence with surges in capital inflows, exchange rate regimes, and 
trade openness. Again, we do not find any significant relationship between monetary and 
fiscal policies and credit booms in developing countries, unlike the case of developed 
countries. On the other hand, financial policies such as financial reforms and improving the 
quality of banking supervision and regulations are more strongly linked to credit booms 
                                                          
11
 There are at least two main challenges, including (1) political economy biases that contribute to 
overspending when revenues are abundant in good times, and (2) the inability of developing countries to 
access external finance to pay for fiscal expansion during downturns.  
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both in developed and developing countries. Overall, our tobit results provide robust 
support for our previous findings.   
 
Table 8: Determinants of the Magnitude of Credit Booms 
 
Dependent variable is deviation of real credit per capita from trend during the boom periods 
 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Whole 
Sample 
Countries 
Advanced 
Economies 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
Explanatory Variables are Lagged  
    
 
      
Credit to GDP 0.260*** 0.153*** 0.485*** 0.607*** 0.447*** 0.199*** 0.838*** 0.842** 
 
(0.0305) (0.0208) (0.114) (0.117) (0.118) (0.0425) (0.212) (0.334) 
GDP Growth 0.872*** 0.787*** 1.629*** 0.640** 0.620 0.741** 1.552* -0.514 
 (0.183) (0.287) (0.455) (0.267) (0.427) (0.323) (0.871) (0.887) 
Inflation -0.0595 0.0729** -0.0114 -0.275*** -0.193 -0.147 -0.144 -0.338 
 
(0.0430) (0.0348) (0.0552) (0.0941) (0.127) (0.368) (0.385) (0.275) 
Current Account 
Balance 0.00724*** 0.0109*** 0.0173*** 0.00343** 0.00611* 0.00263 0.0299*** -0.00981 
 (0.00108) (0.00159) (0.00362) (0.00154) (0.00358) (0.00286) (0.00971) (0.00809) 
Capital Inflows 0.0515 0.0501* 0.672* 0.0615 -0.0359 -0.0177 -0.825 0.0996 
 (0.0333) (0.0293) (0.348) (0.0514) (0.0942) (0.0254) (0.653) (0.757) 
Exchange Rate 
Arrangements -0.00242 0.00370 -3.89e-05 -0.00331 -0.00802* -0.00479** -0.0420** 0.000307 
 
(0.00284) (0.00241) (0.00689) (0.00503) (0.00459) (0.00228) (0.0199) (0.0101) 
Trade Openness -0.0334 0.000143 -0.107 0.0216 -0.0706 -0.0233 -0.198 0.143 
 
(0.0321) (0.0192) (0.107) (0.0610) (0.0774) (0.0268) (0.244) (0.298) 
Monetary Policy Stance 
   
-0.0614 -0.839** -0.163 0.0496 
     
(0.0725) (0.349) (0.312) (0.124) 
Fiscal Policy Stance 
   
-1.142** -0.891*** -1.547* 0.756 
     
(0.491) (0.259) (0.840) (1.257) 
Financial Reforms 
    
0.463*** 0.247* 0.130 0.801*** 
     
(0.130) (0.133) (0.243) (0.294) 
Quality of Bank Supervision 
   
-0.174*** -0.0595*** 0.00146 -0.303*** 
     
(0.0309) (0.0178) (0.0523) (0.0919) 
         Observations 3,701 803 577 2321 848 276 228 344 
# of Countries 156 29 23 104 68 22 18 28 
Note: Panel tobits are estimated with random effects. Coefficient estimates refer to marginal effects. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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5.2. What Are the Determinants of “Bad” Credit Booms? 
 
Stylized facts have shown us that not all credit booms end in banking crises and not all 
banking crises are preceded by episodes of credit booms. In this context, for policy makers, 
it creates a trade-off. Constraining rapid credit growth to prevent banking crises will 
obstruct the process of financial deepening and undermine economic development needs, 
which can overall create substantial costs for developing countries. However, credit booms 
might also build up financial imbalances and jeopardize financial stability and development 
as a whole. Therefore, a very important policy question arises: whether we can mitigate this 
trade-off by distinguishing ahead of time between credit booms ending in crises (“bad” 
booms) and ones ending smoothly (“good” booms).  
 
Results from probit regressions in Table 9 provide some answers to this question
12
. We find 
that both duration and magnitude of credit booms are positively associated with “bad” 
booms with statistically significant coefficients. The longer and bigger a credit boom 
episode is, the more likely it is to end in a banking crisis. The level of credit aggregates also 
matters in identifying whether or not the booms are bad. This suggests that rapid credit 
growth from a low base reflects more of financial deepening than financial instability. This 
is particularly applicable in developing countries where credit aggregates are generally still 
at low levels. However, as the size of their financial sector grows, particularly above the 
level consistent with macroeconomic fundamentals, more attention should be placed on 
consequence of credit booms.  
 
If we look at macroeconomic variables, we find less clear evidence that these variables help 
distinguish “bad” booms from “good” ones. To some extent, our results suggest that credit 
booms in high inflation environments are more likely to end in disaster. Also, we do not 
witness any significant role of macroeconomic and financial policies in identifying the 
“bad” or “good” booms, except for the quality of banking supervision and regulations. This 
suggests that improved quality of banking supervision and prudential regulations clearly 
help reduce the incidence of credit booms turning into financial crises.  
 
Country group dummies are only statistically significant and positive for emerging market 
countries, implying that credit booms in emerging market countries are more likely to end 
                                                          
12
 Given the cross-sectional nature of the variable Duration, we collapse our panel data into cross-
sectional form and estimate probit models, where the dependent variable takes value of 1 if a credit 
boom episode is followed within two years by a banking crisis episode and 0 if the credit boom ends 
softly without a crisis. Each observation reflects the mean value of all variables except Duration over 
each boom period.  
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in a banking crisis when compared with advanced economies. However, we do not find 
such difference for the developing countries.   
 
 
Table 9: Determinants of “Bad” Credit Booms 
 Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 when there is a credit boom 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Boom Duration 0.0712*** 0.0640*** 0.0640*** 0.0934** 0.103** 
 
(0.0201) (0.0195) (0.0243) (0.0414) (0.0527) 
Boom Magnitude 0.00584** 0.00933*** 0.00993*** 0.0115* 0.0371*** 
 
(0.00297) (0.00316) (0.00344) (0.00629) (0.0141) 
Credit to GDP 
  
0.00575*** 0.00863*** 0.0120*** 
   
(0.00118) (0.00232) (0.00290) 
GDP Growth 
  
-0.0177 -0.0205 -0.00453 
   
(0.0113) (0.0205) (0.0238) 
Inflation 
  
0.00291*** 0.0178* 0.00462 
   
(0.00104) (0.0108) (0.00286) 
Current Account Balance   6.87e-05 0.000160 8.65e-05 
   (6.04e-05) (0.000102) (0.000165) 
Capital Inflows 
  
-0.00368 -0.00576 -0.0152 
   
(0.00275) (0.00459) (0.0131) 
Trade Openness 
  
-0.00323 -0.00153 -0.00782 
   
(0.00316) (0.00143) (0.00639) 
Monetary Policy Stance    -0.0113  
    (0.00787)  
Fiscal Policy Stance    -0.000265  
    (0.0152)  
Financial Reforms     0.383 
     (0.408) 
Quality of Bank Supervision    -0.187* 
     (0.110) 
Emerging Market Country 
Dummy 
 
0.0768 0.547* 0.667** 1.013* 
  
(0.0864) (0.299) (0.306) (0.558) 
Developing Country 
Dummy 
 
-0.199** 0.521 0.690 1.310 
  
(0. 776) (0.543) (0.535) (0.969) 
      Observations 159 159 143 75 71 
Notes: Coefficient estimates refer to marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Overall, our findings suggest that it is very hard to predict “bad” or “good” booms based on 
macroeconomic and policy variables. However, the duration and magnitude of the booms, 
as well as the level of credit aggregates, have important implications for the consequences 
of these booms. At the same time, enhancing the quality of banking supervision and 
regulations can help reduce the incidence of “bad” credit booms. 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
Previous studies on credit boom episodes have provided analysis of the experiences of 
advanced and emerging market countries. However, to what degree are these findings 
relevant for developing countries, given that we all know there are different characteristics 
across groups of countries? This study further classifies countries into groups from a large 
data sample and focuses on credit booms in developing economies, with a comparison with 
those in advanced and emerging market economies.    
 
Our analysis finds that developing countries are less likely to experience episodes of credit 
booms, compared with emerging and advanced economies. In the case of booms, the 
duration is also relatively shorter, but with greater magnitude. This is intuitive if we 
consider more financial and economic fluctuations that developing countries have always 
experienced at their relatively low base of financial development. Credit booms in 
developing countries are less associated with systemic banking crises, implying that rapid 
credit growth in these countries is more reflective of financial deepening than of a buildup 
of financial risks. Therefore, for developing countries, preventing credit booms may come 
with a substantial cost of scarifying benefits from possible financial deepening. However, 
as developing countries grow, episodes of credit booms can be an increasing concern. 
 
From probit and tobit regression results, there is some evidence that size of financial system 
and favorable macroeconomic conditions are among the drivers of credit booms; this is true 
across groups of countries. However, the link between macroeconomic policies, namely 
monetary and fiscal policies, and episodes of credit booms is not evident in developing 
countries, in contrast to what we witness in advanced economies. This also suggests that the 
effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies in developing countries is questionable in 
containing credit booms or ensuring that the booms are healthy.  
 
On the other hand, financial policies are significantly associated with credit booms; this is 
evident for both developed and developing countries. Our findings suggest that for 
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developing countries to deal with unhealthy credit booms, financial policies should be 
placed in the front line. Particularly, prudential supervision and regulations can be more 
effective and incur substantially lower costs, compared with monetary and fiscal policies.   
 
Although certain macroeconomic and policy variables can explain the incidence of credit 
booms, we find that it is difficult to distinguish in advance between “bad” and “good” 
credit booms from these variables. However, longer and larger credit booms tend to be 
strongly associated with financial disasters. The likelihood of “bad” credit booms can be 
exacerbated when the level of credit to the private sector is large, after controlling 
macroeconomic variables. Therefore, credit booms can be more dangerous when financial 
deepening is at levels above macroeconomic fundamentals.   
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Appendix 1: Sample of Economies 
29  
Advanced 
Economies  
  
24  
Emerging Market 
Economies 
  
107  
Developing Economies 
        Australia 
 
Brazil 
 
Albania Eritrea Panama 
 Austria 
 
Chile 
 
Algeria Ethiopia Papua New Guinea 
Belgium 
 
China 
 
Angola Fiji Paraguay 
 Canada 
 
Colombia 
 
Antigua and Barbuda Gabon Romania 
 Cyprus 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Argentina Gambia, The Rwanda 
 Denmark 
 
Egypt 
 
Armenia Georgia Samoa 
 Estonia 
 
Greece 
 
Aruba Ghana Senegal 
 Finland 
 
Hungary 
 
Azerbaijan Grenada Seychelles 
 France 
 
India 
 
Bahamas, The Guatemala Sierra Leone 
 Germany 
 
Indonesia 
 
Bahrain Guinea-Bissau Solomon Islands 
Hong Kong 
 
Korea, Rep. 
 
Bangladesh Guyana Sri Lanka 
 Iceland 
 
Malaysia 
 
Barbados Haiti St. Kitts and Nevis 
Ireland 
 
Mexico 
 
Belarus Honduras St. Lucia 
 Israel 
 
Morocco 
 
Belize Iran, Islamic Rep. St. Vincent and the Gren. 
Italy 
 
Pakistan 
 
Benin Jamaica Sudan 
 Japan 
 
Peru 
 
Bhutan Jordan Suriname 
 Malta 
 
Philippines 
 
Bolivia Kazakhstan Swaziland 
 Netherlands 
 
Poland 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Kenya Syrian Arab Republic 
New Zealand 
 
Russia 
 
Botswana Kuwait Tajikistan 
 Norway 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
Bulgaria Kyrgyz Republic Tanzania 
 Portugal 
 
South Africa 
 
Burkina Faso Lao PDR Togo 
 Singapore 
 
Thailand 
 
Burundi Latvia Tonga 
 Slovak Republic 
 
Turkey 
 
Cabo Verde Lebanon Trinidad and Tobago 
Slovenia 
 
U.E.A 
 
Cambodia Lesotho Tunisia 
 Spain 
   
Cameroon Macedonia, FYR Uganda 
 Sweden 
   
Central African Republic Madagascar Uruguay 
 Switzerland 
   
Chad Malawi Vanuatu 
 United Kingdom 
  
Comoros Maldives Venezuela, RB 
United States 
   
Congo, Rep. Mali Vietnam 
 
    
Costa Rica Mauritius Yemen, Rep. 
 
    
Cote d'Ivoire Moldova Zambia 
 
    
Croatia Mongolia 
  
    
Djibouti Namibia 
  
    
Dominica Nepal 
  
    
Dominican Republic Nicaragua 
  
    
Ecuador Niger 
  
    
El Salvador Nigeria 
  
    
Equatorial Guinea Oman 
  
        Note: Among advanced economies, Korea and Czech Republic are typically considered as emerging markets, because they 
still share many macroeconomic features with other emerging economies. Greece was reclassified from being a 
developed market to emerging market status in November 2013 by MSCI Index.  
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Appendix 2: List of Credit Boom Episodes and Peak Years 
29  
Advanced Economies  
  
24  
Emerging Market 
Economies 
  
107  
Developing Economies 
           Australia 1988 
 
Chile 1982 
 
Albania 2008 
 
Madagascar 1971 
Australia 2008 
 
China 1986 
 
Angola 2009 
 
Madagascar 1993 
Austria 1980 
 
Colombia 1997 
 
Bahrain 1999 
 
Madagascar 2008 
Austria 2000 
 
Egypt 1986 
 
Bangladesh 1984 
 
Malawi 1992 
Belgium 1979 
 
Greece 1972 
 
Barbados 1972 
 
Maldives 2008 
Canada 1981 
 
Greece 2008 
 
Barbados 1989 
 
Mali 1975 
Cyprus 1999 
 
India 2008 
 
Belarus 2010 
 
Moldova 2007 
Denmark 1987 
 
Indonesia 1997 
 
Belize 1982 
 
Namibia 1995 
Denmark 2007 
 
Korea, Rep. 1969 
 
Belize 1991 
 
Nepal 1981 
Estonia 2007 
 
Korea, Rep. 1997 
 
Bhutan 1994 
 
Nepal 2009 
Finland 1992 
 
Malaysia 1997 
 
Botswana 1976 
 
Nicaragua 2000 
France 1973 
 
Mexico 1992 
 
Botswana 1992 
 
Niger 1979 
France 1990 
 
Morocco 1997 
 
Bulgaria 1996 
 
Nigeria 2009 
Germany 2000 
 
Pakistan 1966 
 
Burkina Faso 1977 
 
Oman 1977 
Hong Kong 1982 
 
Pakistan 2008 
 
Burkina Faso 1990 
 
Oman 1998 
Hong Kong 1990 
 
Peru 1998 
 
Burundi 1974 
 
Panama 1974 
Hong Kong 1997 
 
Philippines 1983 
 
Burundi 1981 
 
Panama 2001 
Iceland 2006 
 
Philippines 1997 
 
Cabo Verde 1999 
 
Papua New Guinea 2009 
Ireland 1999 
 
Russia 2008 
 
Cambodia 1997 
 
Romania 2008 
Ireland 2008 
 
Saudi Arabia 2009 
 
Cambodia 2008 
 
Samoa 1990 
Israel 1979 
 
South Africa 1985 
 
Central African Rep 2012 
 
Sierra Leone 2009 
Israel 1984 
 
South Africa 2008 
 
Chad 1987 
 
Solomon Islands 2008 
Italy 1973 
 
Thailand 1997 
 
Comoros 1992 
 
Sri Lanka 1995 
Italy 1992 
 
Turkey 1997 
 
Comoros 2010 
 
St. Lucia 2008 
Japan 1973 
 
U.A.E 1978 
 
Congo, Rep. 1986 
 
St. Vincent and the Gren. 1981 
Japan 1992 
 
U.A.E 2009 
 
Congo, Rep. 1999 
 
St. Vincent and the Gren. 1999 
Malta 2007 
    
Costa Rica 1979 
 
Sudan 2006 
Netherlands 1979 
    
Costa Rica 2008 
 
Swaziland 1981 
Netherlands 2000 
    
Dominican Rep. 2003 
 
Swaziland 1991 
Norway 1987 
    
Ecuador 1994 
 
Syrian Arab Republic 1966 
Portugal 1973 
    
Eritrea 1998 
 
Togo 1978 
Portugal 1983 
    
Gabon 1963 
 
Tonga 1981 
Singapore 1973 
    
Gabon 1986 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1972 
Singapore 1983 
    
Georgia 2007 
 
Tunisia 1985 
Singapore 1997 
    
Ghana 1989 
 
Uruguay 1965 
Spain 2007 
    
Grenada 1999 
 
Uruguay 1982 
Sweden 1990 
    
Guatemala 1984 
 
Uruguay 2002 
Sweden 2008 
    
Guyana 1988 
 
Vanuatu 2009 
Switzerland 1980 
    
Honduras 1999 
 
Venezuela, RB 2007 
Switzerland 1990 
    
Honduras 2007 
 
Vietnam 2010 
United Kingdom 1973 
    
Jordan 2007 
 
Zambia 1975 
United Kingdom 1990 
    
Kazakhstan 2007 
 
Zambia 1982 
United Kingdom 2008 
    
Kyrgyz Republic 2007 
 
Zambia 1996 
United States 1988 
    
Lesotho 1997 
   United States 2007 
    
Macedonia, FYR 2008 
    
